Duplicate account private keys from bip32 / bip44 derivation
From the BIP32 spec,
In case parse256(IL) ≥ n or ki = 0, the resulting key is invalid, and one should proceed with the next value for i. (Note: this has probability lower than 1 in 2^127.)
and it seems that the bip32 library automatically selects the next i
in the sequence:
// if parse256(IL) >= n, proceed with the next value for i
if (!ecc.isPrivate(IL)) return this.derive(index + 1);
Does this mean that when deriving the keys for different accounts, if at the account level (as per BIP44) an i
is "skipped", the "skipped" account and the next valid account will have the entirely same tree of keys?
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