Posts

What does the BIP86 tweak guarantee in a MuSig2 Lightning channel, beyond address format?

In a single-signer Taproot address, the BIP86 tweak has a clear meaning: the output commits to no script tree, only a key path. But in a two-party MuSig2 channel, I think it does something extra. Without the tweak, Alice could in principle embed a hidden script path into the funding output — one that lets her spend unilaterally. If both sides independently apply the BIP86 tweak and verify the resulting output key matches, it is effectively a mutual confirmation: "nothing is hidden in this output." So my question: in a MuSig2 channel context, is this the intended security guarantee of BIP86 — preventing the counterparty from embedding a hidden script path? Or does the channel protocol have separate mechanisms that already cover this? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/iW3qtxj via IFTTT

Bitcoin, Global Conflict, and Mining Infrastructure

What are the impacts of the current ongoing war on Bitcoin and the broader cryptocurrency market, and how could disruptions to ASIC hosting and mining operations directly affect Bitcoin’s price, network stability, and decentralization? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/zUkJAnp via IFTTT

Discrepancy in P2SH Redeem Script: Locktime encoding or padding issue (ab vs ad hash result)

Background: I am trying to reconstruct a P2SH redeem script created in early 2026. I have the base data, but there is a 1-bit discrepancy in the resulting Hash160. ​The Data: ​Target Hash160 (Blockchain): 8d2c7a6a124d1551884798d76c8aedab36908bf3. ​Current Script (pt_hex): 0400f6f87bb17576a91470b38fc510ae4a633b4410a25a17c16bbd215cd888ac. ​Calculated Hash from pt_hex: 8d2c7a6a124d1551884798d76c8aedad36908bf3 (Note the 'd' vs 'b' difference). from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/57G42WF via IFTTT

Master XPUB exported from CC to Blue Wallet can't sign as Blue imports it as M44 while it's only M. Address used

In CCQ Advanced Tools --> export Wallet --> export XPUB --> Master XPUB In Blue Wallet Import --> Scan QR code in display It imports as derivation m44. While it should import as derivation m. CCQ can't sign. Resolution without having to put the seed in electrum as comment under Need help moving funds from legacy address, Coldcard won't sign psbt Export/Backup wallet from Blue Wallet Import as watch only legacy in sparrow wallet Manually fill in the fingerprint as given on CCQ Change derivation to m Create psbt and save it to microsd. Sign psbt with CCQ. Want to thank sjorsprovoost to put us in the right path and stack exchange for the above directional. Can't comment under the post yet as we don't have sufficient points to comment. from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/tOBpmq5 via IFTTT

Start9 LND hidden service not reachable externally via Tor — service onions unreachable but Start9 system onion works

Running StartOS 0.3.5-1 with LND 0.20.1 and Bitcoin Core. Trying to connect LND to an external Railway backend over Tor. The problem: LND's Control Interface onion address is unreachable externally. What works: Start9 system onion loads fine in Tor Browser Bitcoin Core has 12 active peer connections over Tor (outbound) LND is Running and Synced to chain and graph curl via SOCKS5 to DuckDuckGo onion works fine What doesn't work: curl via SOCKS5 to LND onion returns SOCKS5 error 5 Bitcoin Core Peer Interface onion also unreachable Tor Browser shows "Unable to connect" for all service onions What I've tried: Reset Tor without wipe state (multiple times) Reset Tor with wipe state Full system restart Turned off "Use Tor for all traffic" and "Stream Isolation" in LND config Previously saw overloaded guard node warning — fixed with wipe state reset Conclusion: Start9's own hidden service publishes fine, but none of the installed service hidd...

I forked Bitcoin. It' Post-Quantum Proof. I figured out a way to honor old accounts

Anyone care to audit the code?? https://github.com/SystemThreat/NEX from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/kAOgL6p via IFTTT

Does inserting a Tapret commitment leaf invalidate the existing control block for other script paths in RGB?

I'm researching how RGB uses Taproot commitments (Tapret, LNPBP-12) and ran a transfer experiment on testnet: 64a14551...c20b6b . The RGB client output shows the state anchored at tapret1st:64a14551...c20b6b:1 — a standard P2TR output on-chain. My understanding is that Tapret inserts an unspendable 64-byte OP_RETURN leaf into the script tree at depth 1, shifting existing scripts one level deeper. This changes the Merkle root, which changes the output key (P2TR address) via the BIP-341 tweak formula. Two questions: If Script_A was originally at depth 1 (single-leaf, empty Merkle path in the control block), after Tapret insertion it moves to depth 2. Does the original control block become invalid? Does the spender need to reconstruct it with the Tapret leaf hash included in the Merkle path? Since the Merkle root changes with every new Tapret commitment, does RGB always derive a fresh P2TR address for each state transition — even if the internal key P remains the same? ...