Posts

Why did BIP-342 replace CHECKMULTISIG with a new opcode, instead of just removing FindAndDelete from it?

Legacy CHECKMULTISIG has FindAndDelete attached to it. SegWit v0 already removed FindAndDelete and kept CHECKMULTISIG working fine. So for tapscript, the simple path was: keep CHECKMULTISIG, say FindAndDelete doesn't run here. BIP-342 didn't do that. It disabled CHECKMULTISIG completely and added CHECKSIGADD, so multisig is now a sequence of opcodes plus a comparison. That's a much bigger change than just fixing the bug. I'd like to understand why. A few things I'm curious about: Was a "clean CHECKMULTISIG" ever considered, and why was it rejected? Was the main reason batch verification with Schnorr, or something else? Or was it a deliberate choice to move away from opcodes that pack whole patterns, toward smaller primitives that script authors combine themselves? The last one matters to me because if it's a real design shift, it probably also shapes how future opcodes (CAT, CSFS, etc.) should look. If anyone was part of those discussions, I'd lo...

Does Binohash grinding behave like a PoW, and is it actually ASIC-resistant?

I've been reading Robin Linus's "Binohash" paper ( Binohash:transaction introspection without softforks , https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/binohash-transaction-introspection-without-softforks/2288 ) and trying to understand the grinding process. My rough understanding: The spender chooses subsets of signatures from a fixed pool embedded in the locking script Each subset changes the scriptCode via FindAndDelete before hashing The goal is to find a subset where the resulting sighash satisfies a leading-zero condition So in practice this looks like a search problem over combinatorial subsets rather than a simple nonce space. Compared to Bitcoin mining: Mining hashes a fixed-size header with a changing nonce Binohash requires modifying KB-sized script data (via FindAndDelete) before each hash Each transaction defines its own independent search space My questions: Is it reasonable to think of this as a kind of PoW, or is that a misleading analogy? What ac...

That take overfits the chart: a dip under 60k and a bounce into a big round zone

You can read the full article to confirme reality at: https://strat-ga.vercel.app/rangebtcarticle4878974412026 That take overfits the chart: a dip under 60k and a bounce into a big round zone does not prove a clean structure shift or a straight run to about 95k. The 70k to 72k area is still just a range until price proves it with sustained strength and follow-through. The 72k and 80k levels are conditions, not facts yet. Past action does not lock in the next leg; the breakdown vs recovery story is still open until those levels are clearly reclaimed and held. from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/V72odie via IFTTT

Does Silent Payments require the sender's input public key to be recoverable from the transaction?

When I implemented a Silent Payments send on testnet, I used a Taproot key-path spend as input. In that case, the sender's public key is directly readable from the witness. But I'm not sure this holds for all input types. For example, in a P2WPKH input the pubkey is in the witness, but for a Taproot script-path spend it may not be directly recoverable. Does BIP352 require the sender's input pubkey to be recoverable? And if the sender uses an input type where the pubkey is not visible, does the protocol break down? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/McDr6Lv via IFTTT

How do I recover my bitcoin lost to fake investment site

THE SILENT GOODBYE NOTHING ENDED SUDDENLY. HIS BUSY LIFE ONCE MADE SENSE—UNTIL IT DIDN’T. HE GREW DISTANT, LESS PRESENT, LESS INVOLVED. THERE WAS NO CLEAR ENDING, JUST SPACE. EVENTUALLY, I DISCOVERED HE WAS WITH A COWORKER. HUB CAN HELP YOU WITH YOUR RECOVERY hubbolt20@gmail.com from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/KJmXHlx via IFTTT

What does the BIP86 tweak guarantee in a MuSig2 Lightning channel, beyond address format?

In a single-signer Taproot address, the BIP86 tweak has a clear meaning: the output commits to no script tree, only a key path. But in a two-party MuSig2 channel, I think it does something extra. Without the tweak, Alice could in principle embed a hidden script path into the funding output — one that lets her spend unilaterally. If both sides independently apply the BIP86 tweak and verify the resulting output key matches, it is effectively a mutual confirmation: "nothing is hidden in this output." So my question: in a MuSig2 channel context, is this the intended security guarantee of BIP86 — preventing the counterparty from embedding a hidden script path? Or does the channel protocol have separate mechanisms that already cover this? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/iW3qtxj via IFTTT

Bitcoin, Global Conflict, and Mining Infrastructure

What are the impacts of the current ongoing war on Bitcoin and the broader cryptocurrency market, and how could disruptions to ASIC hosting and mining operations directly affect Bitcoin’s price, network stability, and decentralization? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/zUkJAnp via IFTTT