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With OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK (CSFS), signatures are verified against an explicit message rather than the transaction sighash. This seems to allow the same (sig, message) pair to be reused across different UTXOs, unless something binds the message to a specific context. Some discussions (e.g. by Jeremy Rubin https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2024/12/02/csfs-ctv-rekey-symmetry/ ) mention re-keying or laddering constructions to mitigate this. My question is: How exactly do CSFS laddering or re-keying schemes prevent cross-UTXO replay in practice? What is the binding mechanism — is it based on chaining commitments, updating keys per step, or something else? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/NYzps2H via IFTTT

I’ve been testing simple opcode combinations — CHECKSIG, CSFS, IK+CSFS....trying to get a feel for what each one actually binds. It feels like the challenge is less about expressiveness, and more about choosing the right kind of binding. I’m wondering: Do developers see this as its own discipline — not Ethereum-style contracts, but something like designing Bitcoin’s contracts within constraints? Does that map to a distinct kind of engineering role over time? Or is this still just considered script work? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/7xwDKoX via IFTTT

I can't transfer my paper wallet BTC to my wallet (Android); I only get the notification "bad connection to Electrum network". How can I solve the issue and access my BTC? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/MYw2lnU via IFTTT

I’ve been running opcode composition experiments (e.g. CAT+CSFS, IK+CSFS) on signet. Related: #130613 , #130598 , Delving thread In several cases, the script validates correctly, but still feels structurally unsafe (e.g. replay, cross-UTXO reuse, weak binding). My question: How do experienced developers recognize these issues early, before they turn into real vulnerabilities? In particular, how do you reason about whether a construction is "too general" or insufficiently bound? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/1lGnXZD via IFTTT

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Following up on #130598 . I built a CAT + CSFS oracle-style script on signet ( commit , reveal ): OP_CAT OP_SHA256 <oracle_pubkey> OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK Witness: [sig, PART1, PART2] Message: SHA256(PART1 || PART2) Since CSFS only checks the message, the same (sig, PART1, PART2) appears to be reusable across multiple UTXOs with compatible scripts. For price oracles this is usually acceptable. But if the goal is single-use authorization (i.e., the signature should only be valid for one specific UTXO): Is committing to the outpoint inside the message the only general approach? Or is there a script-level pattern that avoids requiring the oracle to wait for the UTXO to exist before signing? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/wHOPXSB via IFTTT