LBANK INFO CRYPTOCURRENCY

On mempool.space, testnet3 is marked as deprecated and encourages users to use testnet4. is testnet4 now the canonical testnet for Bitcoin? why not just call testnet4 just testnet now? it's all confusing from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/KJlIvn8 via IFTTT

Browsing early Taproot transactions, I came across this one (block 709,911, ~280 blocks after Taproot activation): https://mempool.space/tx/ef72502f5d2509f519be33304e385bdf9d1bed5e4cd19f7a254700299db2ba91 What caught my eye: It's a P2TR keypath spend, single input, single output, dust-level amount (1943 → 1803 sats) The witness signature is 65 bytes ending in 0x02 — i.e., SIGHASH_NONE (not SIGHASH_NONE|ANYONECANPAY which is 0x82) nSequence is 0x9f (= 159), which under BIP68 would imply a relative timelock of 159 blocks Plain SIGHASH_NONE (without ANYONECANPAY) on a 1-input-1-output transaction seems strange to me — the signer is essentially saying "I authorize spending this UTXO regardless of where the output goes," but there's only one output. Anyone seeing this in mempool could in principle replace the output and rebroadcast. Questions: Is there a known wallet or protocol that signs P2TR keypath with plain SIGHASH_NONE (0x02)? I'd expect 0x82 (NONE|AN...

Bitcoin mining uses SHA-256d: SHA-256(SHA-256(data)) . I recently discovered experimentally (IACR ePrint 2026/109079) that the second SHA-256 application has a structurally constrained message schedule: The second hash always receives exactly 32 bytes (the first hash output) + fixed Merkle-Damgård padding This makes W[8-15] in the second hash always constant (0x80000000... + length encoding) Only 30 unique carry patterns exist in the second hash vs theoretical 2^64 Measurable cross-hash anti-correlation: 9.56σ (confirmed real, scales as √N) My questions: Was this structural property of SHA-256d considered when Bitcoin adopted double-SHA-256? Or was it chosen purely for length-extension attack resistance? Is there any documentation of this constrained W-schedule effect in Bitcoin's design rationale? Does this property have any known implications for Bitcoin's security model beyond length-extension resistance? The correlation is not exploitable (r=0.03, ...

i recently downloaded bitcoin core via https://bitcoincore.org/bin/bitcoin-core-31.0/ i downloaded: bitcoin-31.0-arm64-apple-darwin.zip when i unzipped it, it created the bitcoinqt app. i was expecting it to create a folder directory like below: bitcoin-31.0/ ├── bin/ │ ├── bitcoind │ ├── bitcoin-cli │ └── ... because i want to use bitcoind, not bitcoinqt. before it always created a bitcoind and the other stuff. now i just see the bitcoinqt app. from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/ov1KH7E via IFTTT

Why does every Bitcoin tax tool accept credit cards but not Bitcoin? I built one that fixes this. from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/6pYBzOU via IFTTT

Electricity price is often cited as the primary factor in choosing a mining location. However, I’m curious what other technical or operational factors should be considered, such as grid stability, cooling efficiency, or infrastructure reliability. How do these variables impact long-term mining performance and profitability? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/tS1wEYV via IFTTT

How come Bitcoin community is not acting on this huge threat? They keep saying it is a FUD instead of getting together and coming up with ideas. Without proper roadmap Bitcoin will be eliminated within next 4 years! https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/03/28/watch-out-bitcoin-devs-google-says-post-quantum-migration-needs-to-happen-by-2029 from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/x2DUzWP via IFTTT

I'm familiar with Liquid and Rootstock to issue tokens on Bitcoin, but they require trusting a separate system like a federation or a separate chain. Is there a way to issue fungible tokens directly on Bitcoin and Lightning, without relying on a sidechain or a trusted federation? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/h8uCYSn via IFTTT

I'm researching how RGB uses Taproot commitments (Tapret, LNPBP-12) and ran a transfer experiment on testnet: 64a14551...c20b6b . The RGB client output shows the state anchored at tapret1st:64a14551...c20b6b:1 — a standard P2TR output on-chain. My understanding is that Tapret inserts an unspendable 64-byte OP_RETURN leaf into the script tree at depth 1, shifting existing scripts one level deeper. This changes the Merkle root, which changes the output key (P2TR address) via the BIP-341 tweak formula. Two questions: If Script_A was originally at depth 1 (single-leaf, empty Merkle path in the control block), after Tapret insertion it moves to depth 2. Does the original control block become invalid? Does the spender need to reconstruct it with the Tapret leaf hash included in the Merkle path? Since the Merkle root changes with every new Tapret commitment, does RGB always derive a fresh P2TR address for each state transition — even if the internal key P remains the same? ...

I have two testnet4 nodes, both running Bitcoin Core v30.2 and I use estimatesmartfee API calls to guess fees on the network. I have noticed over time that the estimates vary widely on both nodes and sometimes also by the conf_target . Is there any possibility to make this estimate more reliable? E.g. it currently return on node01 : $ bitcoin-cli estimatesmartfee 3 economical { "feerate": 0.00000974, "blocks": 3 } $ bitcoin-cli estimatesmartfee 10 economical { "feerate": 0.00100314, "blocks": 10 } $ bitcoin-cli estimatesmartfee 50 economical { "feerate": 0.00000988, "blocks": 50 } (please note that the conf_target: 10 has larger fee than for conf_target: 3 ). and on node02 : $ bitcoin-cli estimatesmartfee 3 economical { "feerate": 0.00100369, "blocks": 3 } $ bitcoin-cli estimatesmartfee 10 economical { "feerate": 0.00063429, "blocks": 10 } $ bitcoin-cli...

In Pieter Wuille's recent answer [Why did BIP-342 replace CHECKMULTISIG with a new opcode] , BIP-342's deliberate minimization of semantic changes was attributed to the expectation that "those could always be introduced with later softforks that redefine OP_SUCCESSes." I'm curious about the granularity of this reservation: Were specific opcode candidates (e.g., CHECKSIGFROMSTACK, CAT, TXHASH) already on the radar when OP_SUCCESS positions were allocated, or was the allocation purely abstract — "reserve space for unknown future use"? Was there discussion about classes of additions (introspection opcodes, signature variants, hash operations) that would or wouldn't be appropriate candidates for OP_SUCCESS redefinition vs. requiring a deeper softfork? Are there design properties an opcode SHOULD have to be a clean OP_SUCCESS redefinition (vs. requiring more invasive consensus changes)? I ask because the activation-path mechanics matter for how com...

How long should pruning—say, from 794GB blockchain down to last 2GB—take? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/WJHfx1z via IFTTT

Legacy CHECKMULTISIG has FindAndDelete attached to it. SegWit v0 already removed FindAndDelete and kept CHECKMULTISIG working fine. So for tapscript, the simple path was: keep CHECKMULTISIG, say FindAndDelete doesn't run here. BIP-342 didn't do that. It disabled CHECKMULTISIG completely and added CHECKSIGADD, so multisig is now a sequence of opcodes plus a comparison. That's a much bigger change than just fixing the bug. I'd like to understand why. A few things I'm curious about: Was a "clean CHECKMULTISIG" ever considered, and why was it rejected? Was the main reason batch verification with Schnorr, or something else? Or was it a deliberate choice to move away from opcodes that pack whole patterns, toward smaller primitives that script authors combine themselves? The last one matters to me because if it's a real design shift, it probably also shapes how future opcodes (CAT, CSFS, etc.) should look. If anyone was part of those discussions, I'd lo...

I've been reading Robin Linus's "Binohash" paper ( Binohash:transaction introspection without softforks , https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/binohash-transaction-introspection-without-softforks/2288 ) and trying to understand the grinding process. My rough understanding: The spender chooses subsets of signatures from a fixed pool embedded in the locking script Each subset changes the scriptCode via FindAndDelete before hashing The goal is to find a subset where the resulting sighash satisfies a leading-zero condition So in practice this looks like a search problem over combinatorial subsets rather than a simple nonce space. Compared to Bitcoin mining: Mining hashes a fixed-size header with a changing nonce Binohash requires modifying KB-sized script data (via FindAndDelete) before each hash Each transaction defines its own independent search space My questions: Is it reasonable to think of this as a kind of PoW, or is that a misleading analogy? What ac...

You can read the full article to confirme reality at: https://strat-ga.vercel.app/rangebtcarticle4878974412026 That take overfits the chart: a dip under 60k and a bounce into a big round zone does not prove a clean structure shift or a straight run to about 95k. The 70k to 72k area is still just a range until price proves it with sustained strength and follow-through. The 72k and 80k levels are conditions, not facts yet. Past action does not lock in the next leg; the breakdown vs recovery story is still open until those levels are clearly reclaimed and held. from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/V72odie via IFTTT

When I implemented a Silent Payments send on testnet, I used a Taproot key-path spend as input. In that case, the sender's public key is directly readable from the witness. But I'm not sure this holds for all input types. For example, in a P2WPKH input the pubkey is in the witness, but for a Taproot script-path spend it may not be directly recoverable. Does BIP352 require the sender's input pubkey to be recoverable? And if the sender uses an input type where the pubkey is not visible, does the protocol break down? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/McDr6Lv via IFTTT

THE SILENT GOODBYE NOTHING ENDED SUDDENLY. HIS BUSY LIFE ONCE MADE SENSE—UNTIL IT DIDN’T. HE GREW DISTANT, LESS PRESENT, LESS INVOLVED. THERE WAS NO CLEAR ENDING, JUST SPACE. EVENTUALLY, I DISCOVERED HE WAS WITH A COWORKER. HUB CAN HELP YOU WITH YOUR RECOVERY hubbolt20@gmail.com from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/KJmXHlx via IFTTT

In a single-signer Taproot address, the BIP86 tweak has a clear meaning: the output commits to no script tree, only a key path. But in a two-party MuSig2 channel, I think it does something extra. Without the tweak, Alice could in principle embed a hidden script path into the funding output — one that lets her spend unilaterally. If both sides independently apply the BIP86 tweak and verify the resulting output key matches, it is effectively a mutual confirmation: "nothing is hidden in this output." So my question: in a MuSig2 channel context, is this the intended security guarantee of BIP86 — preventing the counterparty from embedding a hidden script path? Or does the channel protocol have separate mechanisms that already cover this? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/iW3qtxj via IFTTT

What are the impacts of the current ongoing war on Bitcoin and the broader cryptocurrency market, and how could disruptions to ASIC hosting and mining operations directly affect Bitcoin’s price, network stability, and decentralization? from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/zUkJAnp via IFTTT

Background: I am trying to reconstruct a P2SH redeem script created in early 2026. I have the base data, but there is a 1-bit discrepancy in the resulting Hash160. ​The Data: ​Target Hash160 (Blockchain): 8d2c7a6a124d1551884798d76c8aedab36908bf3. ​Current Script (pt_hex): 0400f6f87bb17576a91470b38fc510ae4a633b4410a25a17c16bbd215cd888ac. ​Calculated Hash from pt_hex: 8d2c7a6a124d1551884798d76c8aedad36908bf3 (Note the 'd' vs 'b' difference). from Recent Questions - Bitcoin Stack Exchange https://ift.tt/57G42WF via IFTTT